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ABSTRACT
Syndromic surveillance systems, especially software systems, have emerged as the leading
outbreak detection mechanisms. Early outbreak detection systems can assist with medical
and logistic decision support. One important concern for effectively testing these systems in
practice is the scarcity of authentic outbreak health data. Because of this shortage, creating
suitable geotemporal test clusters for surveillance algorithm validation is essential.
Described is an automated tool that creates artificial patient clusters by varying a large
variety of realistic outbreak parameters. The cluster creation tool is an open-source
program that accepts a set of outbreak parameters and creates artificial geospatial patient
data for a single cluster or a series of similar clusters. This helps automate the process of
rigorous testing and validation of outbreak detection algorithms. Using the cluster
generator, single patient clusters and series of patient clusters were created - as files and
series of files containing patient longitude and latitude coordinates. These clusters were
then tested and validated using a publicly-available GIS visualization program. All
generated clusters were properly created within the ranges that were entered as
parameters at program execution. Sample semi-synthetic datasets from the cluster
creation tool were then used to validate a popular spatial outbreak detection algorithm,
the M-Statistic.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Syndromic Surveillance
Concerns about newly emerging diseases and the possibility of bioterrorism attacks,
coupled with increasing availability of real-time public health data, have led researchers
to develop new suites of outbreak detection systems [1-2, 7-9]. Such systems can, in
principle, give early warning of an outbreak, which can in turn help clinicians and public
health officials make better medical and logistical decisions. To achieve greatest
accuracy, such systems would rely on confirmed disease diagnoses. However, the need
to make quick judgments and the huge potential benefits of recognizing an outbreak early
in its course have favored the creation of systems that rely on recognition of common
syndromes (e.g., "influenza-like illness") rather than waiting for definite diagnoses. Most
systems under active study, therefore, are based on syndromic surveillance.
The fundamental goal of syndromic surveillance systems is to be able to detect a small
number of increased disease cases of one type of outbreak in a shorter time-frame than
would be likely detected by astute physicians or medical administrators. [7] Several
groups have quantified a range of detection goals, and some groups are attempting to
discover small outbreaks (around fifteen extra visits or cases) within three days of the
first abnormal visit to a clinic or emergency department. [11]
Most syndromic surveillance systems to date focus on the number of cases of various
syndromes detected and the clustering of these cases in time. Although these data are of
obvious importance in outbreak detection, we also concentrate on another aspect of the
data: spatial clustering. Indeed, it appears that the combined use of temporal and spatial
clustering in surveillance data provides a better opportunity to recognize possible
outbreaks rapidly.
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Evaluation of syndromic surveillance systems is made difficult by the fact that,
fortunately, actual outbreaks are rare. This thesis therefore addresses the challenging
problem of creating realistic spatio-temporal syndromic data that can be used to
understand the characteristics of surveillance systems.
Evolution and Development of Syndromic Surveillance Systems
Syndromic surveillance systems have evolved a great deal since their emergence
in the late 1990s. There are numerous types and implementations of these real-time
outbreak detection systems that rely on a multitude of data sources. [25] Data streams
range from sources as basic as primary-care location visit records and emergency
department admission records to over-the-counter medication sales, web-based medical
system visits, public and private-sector health-hotline calls, and even orange juice sales.
[14-16] These sources have been selected based on the premise that the earliest signs of a
potential outbreak are aberrations in the expected numbers of visits or relevant purchase
volumes at the time of outbreak analysis.
In order for surveillance systems to be most useful, they should produce alerts in
as timely a fashion as possible. Near real-time data acquisition and analysis is quickly
becoming a standard practice. One example of a real-time syndromic surveillance system
is the Automated Epidemiologic Geotemporal Integrated Surveillance (AEGIS) system
[1], software that tracks patient emergency department visits using live data streams from
northeastern region hospitals. Patient address data is automatically geocoded and chief
complaints are encoded into syndromic categories shortly after the patient has been
admitted to a participating emergency department.
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Software systems to conduct syndromic surveillance often utilize large existing
hospital or retail databases to establish baseline parameters and covariate values. Those
baseline measurements are used to find expected visit ranges for a specific time frame,
which are then compared against directly observed values in a recent time-frame.
Significant deviations from expected values occur with specific likelihood values. If
computed likelihood values are low enough (those values that would correspond to a high
confidence in abnormality of patient distributions,) then outbreak flags are raised. These
so-called red flags should cause medical informatics professionals to further analyze a
potentially emerging situation.
To increase the efficacy of surveillance systems, some organizations that track
detailed patient data have chosen to group patients into syndrome categories. Several
surveillance systems have found increases in sensitivity of outbreak detection and data
analysis if the datasets being analyzed are grouped by syndrome. [2, 24] The national
ESSENCE project [9] has developed a categorization system that utilizes a subset of
ICD-9 (International Classification of Diseases, 9 th Revision) diagnostic codes for each
syndrome that they use for syndrome grouping. A list of the ESSENCE syndrome groups
is shown in Table 1. Another system, the Realtime Outbreak and Disease Surveillance
(RODS) project [8], has created a free-text Complaint Coder (CoCo) which takes a
patient's chief complaint and assigns it to a syndromic category using a Bayesian
classification scheme. Both of these systems then conduct surveillance analysis on
separate groups of patients with similar syndromes.
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Table 1: Syndrome Groups and Diagnoses from the ESSENCE project.
Source: http://www.geis.ha.osd.mil/GEIS/surveillanceactivities/ESSENCE/essenceinstructions.asp
Syndrome Groups Representative Diagnoses
Respiratory cough, pneumonia, upper respiratory infection
Gastrointestinal vomiting, diarrhea
Neurological meningitis, botulism-like symptoms
Dermatologic Hemorrhagic (petechaie, bruising)
Dermatologic infectious (vesicular rashes)
Fever (unspecific fever, sepsis)
Coma (coma, sudden death)
There has also been a good deal of discussion regarding hardware
implementations for real-time surveillance, but they appear to be more difficult than
software solutions in the short term. Effective physical detection of threats is much
harder because it requires a greater infrastructure and expense. Software detection
systems also generally rely on information that is already encoded into computer systems
while hardware detection systems generally derive their data from new sources.
Data availability and variability issues create difficulty with temporal data
analysis in a real-time fashion, but these systems have the potential to provide the
sensitivity to detect a variety of public health outbreaks. [10] Temporal data filtering and
smoothing is an expanding area of biosurveillance research which promise to improve
many of the basic data variability concerns that interfere with optimal outbreak detection.
A number of biosurveillance systems have also started to integrate some notion of
the spatial clustering of patients in area neighborhoods (and aberrations from normal
levels of clustering) into their outbreak detection techniques. Two prominent techniques
in the field that provide values of aberration in spatial clustering from normal spatial
distributions are the M-Statistic [13] (described in more detail later) and the Spatial and
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Space-Time Scan Statistic, SaTScan. [11] The M-Statistic technique uses the deviation
of the current distribution of inter-point distances (the distances between each patient and
every other patient) from the distribution that would normally be expected, as a metric for
spatial closeness. SaTScaN uses either a Poisson-based model, a Bernoulli model, or a
space-time Permutation model, using user-provided patient visit data as the source of the
underlying expected distribution.
Geocoding of patient addresses
All addresses are represented by latitude-longitude pairs in the cluster creation tool
and in the implemented spatial detection algorithm. This standard was chosen because it
is the most general and it avoids ambiguities that may arise from duplicate addresses or
artificial boundaries such as zip codes. Patient addresses are geocoded into this format
and then patients are categorized by their chief complaints (which are almost always
recorded and coded by medical institutions.) [20-23] This allows doctors or medical
practitioners to determine whether there is a correlation between patient location, time of
visit, and symptoms. If this information is gathered for all patients at all times, it is easier
to detect an outbreak when it occurs, because the outbreak data can be compared against
expected baseline data from similar time periods. [25]
Calculating Sensitivity and Specificity of Outbreak Detection Systems
The quality of a detection system can only be assessed by observing its behavior on
test cases of interest. To do so, we need to find or create valid test clusters of patients
with disease and then measure how well our system is able to detect those patients.
Bioterrorism Detection Ciuster Creation Tool 8
Detection efficacy is usually measured in terms of the sensitivity and specificity of the
detector.
This project focuses on both problems by creating valid artificial test clusters that vary
under a large variety of realistic parameters and then detecting those test clusters using a
spatial detection technique. In order to create realistic detection mechanisms for large
datasets, those datasets need to be tested using realistic physical outbreak data. A cluster
creation tool that creates simple geo-temporal clusters of artificial patient data is part of
this work and is freely available for download (see Appendix B). The current
implementation is described here and its use in validating the real-time M-Statistic spatial
scanning algorithm is described in Chapter 4.
Datasets for benchmarking performance
Datasets for evaluating the performance of algorithms used in outbreak detection may
be measured using authentic data, synthetic data, or combinations of the two. Two kinds
of purely authentic datasets are possible. One is genuine syndromic data that is
contemporaneous with a known specific outbreak. The outbreak could be a large-scale
event such as a winter influenza surge. [14] Alternatively, it could be a more
circumscribed event such as a diarrheal outbreak. [15] The dataset would contain the
background of ordinary disease or symptom occurrence and the signal of the actual
outbreak. A second type of authentic dataset is a hybrid one containing background from
a regional surveillance system spiked with cases from a known outbreak. This approach
was taken when over-the-counter medication sales data were spiked with an outbreak
based on the Sverdlosk incident. [16] Alternatively, one can also construct a hypothetical
baseline and impose and inject actual or simulated signals. While this approach is valid,
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there is little need to simulate background activity, given the readily available abundance
of real signal streams from surveillance systems.
The approach that we explore in detail is to superimpose simulated signal onto
authentic baseline. This tactic offers the opportunity to explore the impact of controlled
variations of the signal characteristics. Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches
to creating this simulated signal. One could produce multistage, multivariate
mathematical models to produce the signal. Alternatively, it is also possible to define a
series of parameters enabling the generation of a controlled feature-set simulated signal.
For example, a complex mathematical model [18] might begin with a particular form of
aerosolized anthrax being dispersed under a certain set of atmospheric conditions over a
specific geographic region with a well-characterized population demographic. The
number of susceptible individuals might be estimated and their subsequent behaviors
modeled. The resulting impact on the syndromic surveillance data set, be it retail sales,
primary care visits or emergency department visits, could be projected. The difficulty
with this type of approach to creating simulated signals is that such detailed models
require a great deal of hand-crafting. Furthermore, many different models might be
needed to provide realistic signals corresponding to various plausible scenarios of
outbreak or attack.
Any model that we choose to generate data will make certain assumptions about
the simulated events that it models, and the resulting data may be misleading either
because the assumptions are inappropriate to certain kinds of events or because the
models may fail to take important aspects of the event into account. An example of
inappropriateness may be an assumption that all bioterrorist outbreaks lead to an initially
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exponential rise in observed cases; though reasonable for infectious diseases, this would
be inappropriate for non-infectious toxic agents. An example of an overly-simple model
might assume that all observed cases occur simultaneously at some specific time after
exposure.
We have tried to find a compromise between taking on the overly difficult task of
accurately modeling many different types of outbreaks and accepting too simplistic a
generative model that fails to simulate the dynamics of actual outbreaks of interest. In
our model, we can vary the number of cases in an outbreak, the temporal pattern with
which they appear in the data, and the sizes and locations of spatial clusters within which
they appear. We do not attempt, however, to include much more detailed behaviors that
would require modeling notions such as wind spread or varying susceptibility of different
populations.
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Chapter 2: Parameterizing an Outbreak
Background noise can be spiked with additional cases configured as spatial or
temporal clusters, describable as a controlledfeature set. A variety of adjustable
parameters, described below, enable manipulation of the simulated outbreaks. Optimally,
a training dataset should be modeled and the artificial outbreak signal should be injected
into a validation dataset, though there may not always be sufficient data to do so. If there
is not, the artificial outbreak signal may be injected into the same data used for training.
There are many components in a controlled feature set that are relevant in describing a
specific type of outbreak. Some of these components are specifically related to the
temporal distribution of patients, some are specifically related to the spatial distribution
of patients, and some only rely on the total number of patients that arrive.
Spatial features
A semi-synthetic data cluster has a spatial controlled feature set, which includes a
number of important spatial components. The spatial relationship among the synthetic
patient cases, which are represented as geocoded coordinates (latitude and longitude) is
important - some primary components are whether the points are added in a uniform
fashion, a random fashion, and what the overall physical shape of the cluster pattern will
be. The cluster may also be described in terms of a maximum cluster radius (or other
possible maximum distance in a non-circular outbreak), the density of the distribution of
cases within that radius, and also by the relative location (or the 'angle') from a fixed
point such as a hospital or urgent-care facility. Simulating spatial clusters raises
additional challenges as well, including the identification of realistic locations for
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simulated cases, based on the spatial features of a region--such as the locations of
housing and of bodies of water.
Outbreak Duration
This describes the number of days that a specific geo-temporal outbreak signal
should span. It is useful to execute simulations over a range of outbreak durations and a
number of factors might influence the range chosen. Different agents can cause
outbreaks of varying lengths -- while a surge in influenza activity might last several
weeks, an outbreak of meningitis in a college dorm might only last for several days.
Furthermore, the temporal window used by the detection system may have substantial
impact on how outbreaks of different magnitudes are detected. If the detection window
were based, for example, on a sliding moving average of seven days, two or three day
long outbreaks will be smoothed out; under certain conditions this smoothing may dilute
the signal. Conversely, outbreaks gently trending upward in numbers might not be
detected with a shorter sliding window.
Outbreak spacing
An efficient way to measure outbreak detection performance and the factors that
influence it is to spike a data stream with many individual outbreaks. Generally, the
more outbreaks presented to a model-based system, the more accurately the system's
detection performance can be characterized. In order to maximize the number of
simulated outbreaks in the dataset, one can introduce multiple non-overlapping outbreaks
in a single dataset (e.g. a five day outbreak beginning on day 1, another five day outbreak
beginning on day 11, another on day 21, etc.). The outbreaks are then removed and
replaced by a different set of non-overlapping outbreaks and again presented to the
system (e.g. days 2, 12 and 22). For measurement purposes, it is critical to ensure that all
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individual outbreaks are temporally isolated -- meaning that any response to the previous
outbreak has been completely eliminated from the system before the next outbreak is
encountered. For individual outbreaks to be temporally isolated, it is necessary for the
time-filtering window, if it is larger than one day, to be smaller than the number of days
between injected outbreaks. Such temporal isolation is critical for accurate
measurements of detection performance, though it will not directly address the ability of
the system to detect overlapping outbreaks. By shifting the outbreaks in time, the
outbreaks are affected by different regions of noise. By spacing outbreaks throughout the
year, the effect of seasonal changes in the background on outbreak detection can be
measured as well. Understanding the effects of different regions of background noise
cannot be accomplished without the use of simulation.
Outbreak temporal progression
The time course of an outbreak spreading through a population can follow any
one of many paths, effectively producing a signature shape, related to an epidemic curve.
For example, a highly infectious disease such as smallpox could spread exponentially
over time, while a point-source exposure, not contagious person to person, such as an
anthrax release, would be unlikely to grow exponentially. Several canonical shapes of
temporal progression may be used in simulations to characterize the detection
performance of surveillance systems. Flat outbreaks introduce a fixed number of extra
visits per day for the duration of the outbreak -- for example, [10,10,10,10,10] extra visits
for a five-day outbreak. Linear outbreaks introduce a linearly increasing number of extra
visits per day over the course of the outbreak -- for example, [5,10, 15, 20, 25] extra visits
over a five-day outbreak. Exponential outbreaks introduce an exponentially increasing
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number of extra visits per day over the course of the outbreak -- for example
[2,4,8,16,32] extra visits over a five-day outbreak. Sigmoid shaped outbreaks mirror
epidemiological phenomena where the number of affected individuals rises exponentially
at first, then slows down until it plateaus at a new fixed level -- for example [2,4,8,12,14]
extra visits over the course of a five-day outbreak. Alternatively, a model of more
complex shape, described by a multinomial, such as the Sverdlosk [5] outbreak, might be
desirable.
Outbreak magnitude
Because the minimum detectable size of an outbreak is often of interest, outbreak
detection performance should be tested over a range of signal magnitudes; detection
performance may vary substantially depending on these magnitudes. This variability is
primarily due to the changes in signal-to-noise ratio that result from different outbreak
sizes. For small outbreaks that are at or near the "noise floor" of the model -- the usual
level of random variability in the model's predictions -- the detection performance is
typically very poor, because it is hard to distinguish outbreaks from the random noise of
the model. As the relative size of the outbreaks increases, identifying the outbreaks in the
presence of the noise becomes easier. Once the outbreak magnitude is large enough such
that the noise does not effectively mask it all, the outbreak detection performance of the
system typically plateaus at or near perfect detection.
In order to identify an appropriate range of outbreak magnitudes for the
simulations, it is worthwhile to characterize the error, or noise profile of the model. To do
so, the daily forecast errors of the model, defined as the forecast value minus the actual
value for each day, must be calculated. The error profile can be visualized by plotting a
Bioterrorism Detection Cluster Creation Tool 15
histogram of these daily forecast errors, and standard deviation of the error distribution.
As a general rule of thumb, outbreak magnitudes should range from near zero to at least
twice the standard deviation of the forecast error. As an example, consider a model of
emergency department visits with mean of 140 visits per day, and an error profile with a
standard deviation of 20 visits. In this case it is helpful to run simulations of outbreaks
ranging in magnitude from 0 to 40 visits per day. This range can be sampled in intervals
of 5, yielding the following set of outbreak magnitudes [0,5,10,15,20,25,30,35,40].
It is important to note that the error profile of a model could vary through the year
due to seasonal differences in the variability of the signal. For example, respiratory visit
rates could vary much more unpredictably in the winter than in the summer. In such
cases, it may be useful to construct separate error profiles for different seasons in order to
tailor the detection test to each season.
Bioterrorism Detection Cluster Creaition Tool 16
Metrics for detection performance
Sensitivity and specificity
There is always a tradeoff between sensitivity and specificity and the ability to
detect outbreaks must be balanced against the cost of false alarms. [4] For evaluation
purposes, it can be useful to hold sensitivity or specificity constant when plotting the
other against another variable, such as outbreak magnitude, or outbreak duration. For
example, specificity may be held constant while plotting sensitivity vs. outbreak
magnitude. For each outbreak magnitude, the alarm threshold should be tuned until the
desired number of false alarms -- and thus the desired specificity -- is achieved. The
rationale for tuning the alarm threshold to a desired specificity for the outbreak detection
algorithm is rooted in the fact that a certain level of false alarms is acceptable to the
system so that it will be optimally sensitive with a specific number of user-specified
alerts. At this point the resulting sensitivity under these conditions is measured. This
process is repeated for each outbreak magnitude, ultimately yielding a plot of sensitivity
vs. outbreak magnitude with specificity fixed. The likelihood of not having an alarm
when there is no signal (specificity) can be measured simply by running the model on the
baseline data without inserted artificial outbreaks.
Overall outbreak detection vs. outbreak day number
Because the outbreaks presented to the system typically will be longer than one
day, sensitivity and specificity can be measured either in terms of detection of specific
outbreak days or of the overall outbreak. Using the outbreak-day approach, each day is
considered a separate, independent case -- if a particular five-day outbreak is detected on
three of the days, but missed on the other two days, there are three successes (true
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positives) and two failures (false negatives). Similarly, each of the intervening non-
outbreak days is considered independently when calculating false positive and true
negative rates.
Using the overall outbreak detection approach, each outbreak is viewed as a
single entity; if the outbreak is correctly detected on any one of the outbreak days (logical
OR), the system has produced a true positive. An alternative criterion for a true positive
is that the outbreak was correctly detected on a majority of the outbreak days. When
reporting the overall outbreak sensitivity ("The system detected x% of all the outbreaks
presented to it."), it is very helpful, in conjunction to present full sensitivity and
specificity statistics are reported using the "outbreak-days" approach.
Receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves
The tradeoff between sensitivity and specificity is well portrayed by ROC curves, which
plot sensitivity vs. [1 - specificity]. For tests that have no diagnostic value, the ROC
curve is a straight line along the diagonal of the plot. Plots of tests with higher diagnostic
value have the line curved away from the middle of the plot. The area under the ROC
curve can thus be used as a measure of the diagnostic value of a test. [12] The diagnostic
value of two tests can be compared by comparing the areas under their respective ROC
curves.
More specifically, it is possible to compare two tests with their ROC curves if it is
known, a priori, about which sensitivity or specificity (which part of the curve) the
detector will be operating at. In other words, if it is known that the detector will be run at
a specificity of 97% because 3% is the greatest number of false alarms that will be
tolerated, then it is possible to argue that it is only the sensitivity of two competing tests
Bioterrorism Detection Cluster Creation Tool I S
at that specificity that matters. It is not necessarily the case that you would still prefer a
test whose area under ROC curve is lower if it happens to be better at this desired
operating point.
Bioterrorism Detection Cluster Creation Tool 19
Chapter 3: Creating a Cluster Generation Tool
A cluster generation tool that creates single clusters and related series of synthetic
patient clusters was created that allows facilitates efficient spatiotemporal outbreak
detection testing. The tool is designed to create clusters of patients with similar
syndromes in a user-specified distribution. The cluster data points will be added to a
larger database (with many patients over a long period of time) and then each dataset can
be tested using detection algorithms to determine whether that detection models can
uncover a specific type of artificial cluster.
The cluster generation tool can also generate various sets of clusters that range in
value over a single parameter to rigorously test detection algorithms. The generator can
also be easily altered to create additional types of clusters that follow other spatial and
temporal distributions.
GIS Datapoints and Earth Surface Measurements
It was necessary to calculate several fundamental GIS measurements to create the
basic geospatial data engine for the cluster generator. Artificial patient datapoints are to
be added following several parameters, many of which require the creation of a
relationship between Earth surface measurements in meters and degrees of latitude and
longitude. The number of degrees of latitude and longitude varies per number of meters
of distance measured on the Earth's surface at each latitude and longitude. GIS
conversions that would properly calculate these distances were necessary to create.
Bioterrorism Detection Cluster Creation Tool 2)0
An important consideration was picking an appropriate distance conversion model for
the calculations. Sphere equations break down significantly at small distances, but the
Haversine formula is correct at almost all populated points on the Earth's surface. At
several Longitude and Latitude pairs the Haversine formula was tested for accuracy. At
each Latitude-Longitude, the distance between two datapoints was measured and then
compared to the result that Microsoft Corporation's MapPoint GIS mapping tool
produced for the same measurement.
Using the Haversine Formula
To use the Haversine calculation, the Earth has radius R, and the locations of two points
in spherical coordinates (longitude and latitude) have names loni,latl and lon2,lat2. In
psuedocode, the Haversine Formula [3] is calculated with the following code:
dion = lon2 - loni
diat = lat2 - lati
a = (sin(dlat/2))A2 + cos(lati) * cos(lat2) *
(sin(dlon/2) )^2
c = 2 * atan2(sqrt(a), sqrt(1-a))
d=R* c
This system gives mathematically and computationally exact results. The intermediate
result c is the great circle distance in radians. The great circle distance d will be in the
same units as R.
Distance Measurement Methods
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Programmatic methods were written to solve a number of other geocoding basic needs,
generally involving latitude-longitude datapoints and physical Earth surface distances.
Inside the main GIS class, we have three primary methods to handle these basic data
conversions. The first is a method to find the distance between to latitude-longitude
points, which uses the specific latitude-longitude of the first datapoint to create a ratio of
degrees per physical unit of distance (meters were used) in each direction (N-S latitude
and E-W longitude). The ratios are calculated by first creating artificial datapoints in
each direction that are a 0.05 degrees to the north and to the east, and the corresponding
physical distances are calculated using the Haversine Fornula (discussed above) and then
the ratios are computed (using the artificial datapoint distance divided by the calculated
physical distance.)
A second method was created to find the second latitude-longitude point that is a
certain physical distance, measured at a specific angle, from a first latitude-longitude
datapoint. The angle was measured from the Euclidian x-axis and increased in a counter-
clockwise form. The distance from the first point was entered in meters, and the output
was a second GIS datapoint that was related to the first point and the parameters entered.
Finally the methods were created that found the number of degrees latitude-longitude
per unit of physical distance, in meters (in each respective direction.) These methods
were then used in the above two methods for those basic calculations.
Basics of Date Algorithms Implemented in Cluster Generator
Cluster data points in a real outbreak are added at different rates, depending on a
number of factors including the type of outbreak and the type of people it affects. One of
these factors is the temporal growth pattern of the cluster. Three date algorithms
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(temporal growth algorithms) were implemented to model the ways in which a disease
might grow in time: a random growth-pattern, a linear growth-pattern, and an exponential
growth-pattern.
The random, linear, and exponential models were chosen as a base set because they
were the simplest, most widely-applicable models. The random algorithm simulates a
disease which randomly affects the population. An example of such an outbreak is the
recent Anthrax attacks where several people in the United States were affected in a
scattered random pattern. The linear algorithm models an outbreak which increases at a
constant rate, which may be more applicable for a non-communicable infection that may
be spreading spatially with respect to time. The exponential algorithm is probably the
most realistic algorithm for some communicable infections, because at first a disease will
affect only a few people and then grow exponentially at a rate determined by the motility
of the population, the incubation period of the disease being studied, the population
susceptibility rate, and the transmission rate for that disease. The rate of growth for the
linear and exponential algorithms can be adjusted with a multiplier, based on those
factors for how the disease spreads.
When designing the system, the date-assignment algorithms were separated from other
parts of the implementation in the rest of the system so that it would be easy to add more
date algorithms to model different types of outbreaks.
The algorithms are described in Fig. 1, below. For the random algorithm, a random
number is generated between 1 and the number of days in the cluster. This produces a
random date distribution. For a linear distribution, we divide the day value (1, 2, 3, etc.)
by the sum of the day values and multiply it by the total number of points to determine
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the fraction of the total points that occur on that day. This is also scaled by a multiplier to
alter the rate of linear growth. Similarly for the exponential distribution, we divide
e (multplier*day number) by the sum of all of the e(multiplier*day number) day values and multiply by
the number of points to determine the number of points that occur on that day. Figures 2
and 3 show examples of linear and exponential growth-pattern probability distribution
estimations.
Random:
Number_of pointsjin_ cluster = (rand# )(mod_# _of days)
Linear:
_ 
day valueNumber-ofpointsin cluster- )dayyalue (total numbr-of-poiis) (multiplie)
total dayvalues
Exponential
e A (multiplie * day number,Numberof pointsin_clusteronthatday=0( 1v(totalnumrr of_poits)total day values
Figure 1: Three date algorithms have been implemented in the Cluster Creation program: Random, Linear, and
Exponential.
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x(total _#-_pts )1+2+...+x
-mumptsday_3= (30)=15
.num - pts _day _2 = (2)(30)= 10
-- num - pts _day _= 1 (30)= 5
Figure 2: An example of the linear date algorithm estimation for thirty points spanning three days.
e^A(x) )(total_#_pts)
eA2+...+e AX
day 3 e^(3) (30)= 20
- - =e^Al+ e^A2+e^A3)
day2= eA(2) (30)= 7.3
_ d y eA+e+ eA 3)
day -I= () (~3 0)= 2.7
Figure 3: An example of the exponential date algorithm estimation for thirty points spanning three
days.
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Parameters for Cluster Creation Tool
Input Parameters: Single Cluster
The following are the current input parameters for creating a single patient cluster
(Table 1). Parameters can be added or deleted by updating the GUI and modifying the
GenerateCluster function in the cluster generator class.
Table 2: Parameters that can be altered when creating a single cluster.
Cluster ID Number
Number ofPoints in the cluster
"Reference Point" GIS
Location
Maximum cluster radius
"Angle "from the Hospital
Distancefrom the hospital
Numbers of Days the Cluster
should span
Date Algorithm
Description and output
filenames
User specified reference or identification number for each
cluster. Within each cluster, every point will have its
own identification number which will range from 0 to n-
1, where n is the number of cluster points.
Number of patients or points in the generated cluster.
The latitude-longitude coordinates of the reference point
coordinate, which could be a hospital or a primary care
facility, for example.
The distance of the outermost point in the cluster from
the center of the cluster.
The angle of the cluster from the hospital with respect to
the latitude/longitude of the reference GIS location,
measured counter-clockwise from due east as zero
degrees, using unit circle convention.
The distance of the cluster center point from the hospital.
The number of days from when the first person shows
symptoms to when the last person does.
This specifies which of the three (additional are are
possible) to choose.
The user can specify where the cluster data and user-
specified cluster description will be written.
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Parameters for Cluster Creation Tool
Input Parameters: Sets of Clusters
The tool can generate a series of cluster which vary in one of five ways, which are
described below. The user specifies the number of clusters to create and selects which
parameter to vary. He also specifies a minimum and maximum value for which to vary
the parameter, which will also be described below.
* Number ofpoints in the cluster - The total number of points in the cluster will be
varied over all the clusters.
* Maximum distance from cluster center point (radius) - A number of clusters will
be created, all in the same location, but each with a different radius.
* Number of days of cluster duration - This varies the number of days that each
cluster spans.
* Angle around the hospital - A number of clusters will be created around the
hospital with the angle varied.
* Distancefrom hospital - The clusters will be along the same line at different
distances from the hospital.
Output Files from Cluster Creation Tool
The Cluster Creation Tool creates at least two output files every time it is run. These file
names are specified by the user in the input parameters. The program creates a data file
for every cluster that is created and a record file describing the cluster. The data file
contains the cluster point ID # (assigned numerically from 0 to the number of points
minus 1), the longitude and latitude of the cluster point, and the relative date of the
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cluster point. Figure 4 displays a sample output file. When generating a series of
clusters, the program automatically generates n files with appended identifiers. For
example, when creating 10 clusters, the program would generate 10 files of the output file
name each appended with a number from 0 to 9.
0,-71.10793353860446,42.360580952101984,4
1,-71.10616263466369,42.3636042625572,3
Figure 4: Sample data file output.
Cluster Generator User Interface
The user interface, displayed below in Figure 5, for the cluster generator uses the
Java Swing toolkit to allow users to quickly select desired parameters for cluster creation.
The user enters appropriate values into the text boxes for the type of cluster creation (or
series cluster creation methods) and then selects using radio button the desired time-
course for cluster entries. Users may also select where in the file system to save the
output files from the cluster generation. There are two distinct output files for which the
user should select a destination and a filename. Once the user has made the appropriate
selections, it is possible to create a single cluster or a series of clusters by clicking the
appropriate button. The user interface will alert the user whether the clusters were
created successfully, and if they were not created successfully, an alert window will
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appear which describes the error or exception that was thrown from the generator
program.
Figure 5: Cluster Generator Graphical User Interface
Results of Cluster Generation
Two sample scenarios for use of the cluster creation tools are described below. The
first example demonstrates the use of the cluster creation tool to create a single artificial
patient datapoint cluster, while the second demonstrates the use of the series of patient
clusters creator.
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Sample Program Input and Output:
Example 1: Creating a Single Patient Cluster:
The first example is the creation of a single artificial patient datapoint cluster. This first
cluster includes patient reports of an outbreak that spans five days with the following
parameters:
Cluster ID:
Number of Points in Cluster:
Centerpoint:
Longitude:
Latitude:
Cluster Radius:
Angle from centerpoint:
Distance from centerpoint:
Number of Days:
Cluster Description:
442 (randomly assigned by user)
30
(MIT)
-71.09516
42.35666
600 m
90
1600 m
5
Linear time-growth cluster North of MIT
This linear time-growth cluster has been placed approximately 1 mile (1 600m) due North
of MIT, which is described by the latitude-longitude datapoint (-71.09516, 42.35666).
Example 1: CSV Text Output Sample:
The CSV (comma-separated output file, described above,) for the single cluster example
is pal tially described by the portion of the sample output below. Eleven points are listed,
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but thirty are actually enumerated in the output file. It is of value to notice that the dates
are enumerated using the linear algorithm and so there are two points on the first day,
four on the second day, six on the third day, continuing in the file to complete
enumeration of the thirty patient points and five days spanned.
0,-71.09600452536358,42.37455407329273,1
1,-71.10149672138236,42.365894560466806,1
2,-71.0954755413253,42.373890954435524,2
3,-71.08968377859539,42.37242100053542,2
4,-71.09281946336338,42.36955324904336,2
5,-71.09564524977307,42.371694560897,2
6,-71.09345472615571,42.370979504450304,3
7,-71.09983295495935,42.369683605959985,3
8,-71.09781606117451,42.37282397457113,3
9,-71.09685871099056,42.37540065852763,3
10,-71.0921214185705,42.37216701505921,3
... (to point with ClusterID 29)
Example 1: Microsoft MapPoint GIS Mapping Output for Single Cluster:
The output csv file was next imported into a GIS analysis tool created by Microsoft,
called MapPoint 2002. The map below, Fig. 5, illustrates the faithful creation of the set
of points in the single patient data cluster. The date of each patient in the artificial
outbreak cluster is described by the color of the patient circle.
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Figure 6: A single linear time-growth cluster north of MIT.
Example 2: Creating a Series of Clusters (Varying Angle)
Varied angle around centerpoint (MIT) and created 4 clusters.
Minimum angle: 0
Maximum angle: 270
Number of Clusters: 4
Centerpoint: MIT (same LongLat point as above)
Cluster Radius: 400m
Distance from MIT: 3000m
In this example, the angle around MIT was varied in the series of four clusters that were
generated. The series cluster generator created four files automatically, and each file was
imported into MapPoint with a different color, and charted, shown below in Fig. 6.
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Figure 7: Creation of a series of four clusters about MIT (with the angle varied.)
Creating a Set of Outbreak Datasets for Spatial Detection
Algorithm Validation
To rigorously evaluate spatial detection algorithms, it will be valuable to create a
set that contains patient cluster datasets that span a reasonably-valid range of parameter
values, as described in Chapter 2. A set of 360 artificial patient clusters were created
using the cluster generator that varied over ranges of distance from the hospital, total
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number of patients in the cluster, size of patient cluster (or cluster density), relative angle
with respect to the hospital,
Evaluating the Accuracy and Uniformity of Generated Clusters
Semi-synthetic datasets created by the cluster generator fall within a specified set of
parameter-based boundaries. Cluster data points are created randomly within the domain
defined by those parameters, so it is important to verify that the clusters are accurately
created and are close to uniformly generated.
To measure the uniformity of generated clusters, 10 test clusters were created with 100
points in each cluster. The centroid of each set of cluster points was then calculated and
compared to the specified center point of that cluster. In every case, the cluster centroid
was within five percent of the specified cluster radius, in distance, from the specified
center point. This result demonstrates that the datasets are uniform, within a small
threshold, when they contain a sufficient number of points, as would be expected with a
random distribution.
To measure the accuracy of the geocoding engine, 360 clusters were made, forming a
circle, around a single center point, varying the angle evenly (one degree added per
cluster,) and they each had a cluster center point that fell precisely along the circle
defined by all points at the same radial distance from the original counterpoint. This
same test was conducted at five randomly selected latitude-longitude locations and the
same results were obtained.
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Chapter 4: Implementation and Validation of
M-Statistic Real-Time Spatial Detection
A spatial detection algorithm was implemented to evaluate the cluster generation
program described in the previous chapter. The specific algorithm, the M-statistic, is an
interpoint-distance based detection algorithm that analyzes patient distributions with
single-syndrome, single-week sets of patients in an area. A rich treatment of the basic
algorithm and the metrics used is provided in the original paper. [13]
To create a baseline set of values that would be expected to evaluate how spatially
clustered each week's patients are, historical patient address data are analyzed. Four
years of Children's Hospital Boston data were taken and seasonally separated for each
syndrome. For each summer, for example, data for all patients with each syndrome were
taken and combined. Each patient's distance to every other patient over the four
summers was calculated in miles. With N patients in those four summers, there are a
total of N * (N - 1) /2 distances that are calculated.
All of those distances, in increasing order, were placed into 10 equally sized bins,
such that each bin contained approximately 10 percent of the total distances. The cutoffs
were then determined for those seasonal, specific syndrome bins, as distances in miles.
The first bin, for example, started with 0 miles and the final bin ended with 100 miles,
because the total distance from the hospital that was maximally allowable in the study is
50 miles. (Two patients can each be 50 miles from the hospital, on opposite sides of the
hospital, for a total inter-point distance of 100 miles.)
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After the baseline distribution values have been calculated, it is possible to evaluate how
different the distribution of patients from a specific single week might be. For M patients
that arrive at the emergency department in a specific week, the M (M - 1) / 2 inter-point
distance values are calculated. Those values are then placed into the appropriate bins that
were established in the baseline distribution calculation. Now, inside the bins, there is an
uneven distribution - originally the bins had each contained ten percent of the total inter-
point distances. At this stage, because all of the inter-point distances in this calculation
only depend on the patients that have arrived in the ED in the present week, these
distances will likely be equally distributed into the bins with ten percent in each.
The M-Statistic for the current week is then calculated using the formula below.
The transpose of the vector observed minus expected values for each bin entry (ten
entries for the ten bins) is taken and multiplied by the column vector product found by
multiplying the inverse of the seasonal covariance matrix with the observed minus
expected vector. The final value recovered from this multiplication is a single inner-
product value
M = (obs - exp)T x [S* (obs - exp)]
ob s = 1 x 10 matrix of normalized observed proportions
exp = 1 x 10 matrix of normalized expected proportions
S = 10 x 10 variance-covariance matrix of the baseline proportions (calculated
with data for 105 weeks)
T refers to the transpose of the matrix
S o refers to the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of the S matrix
Proportions were normalized as follows:
Proportion = bin freq (total for all bins x 100) 100 = maximum pair-wiqe
distance
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Detection Strategies
Outbreak detection systems must decide whether an outbreak has occurred in a relevant
dataset. To determine whether there is cause to alert public health officials, several
detection strategies can be employed. Each of these detection strategies accounts for a
specific segment of the total domain of outbreak information that is derived from the M
statistic test, including the spatial clustering 'in' value and the total number of patients,
the 'n' value. It appears that the n*m product value is also a useful metric for detection
of patient clustering, as it accounts for so-called spatio-temporal clustering, which uses
both knowledge of the abnormality of spatial clustering and temporal aberrations. As a
product, the value also increases the standard deviation of the distribution of possible
achievable result values, thus potentially increasing the specificity of the test. Below is a
table which describes the rules that are associated with each of the four detection
strategies and section of the n, m domain they each occupy.
Table 3: M-Statistic Detection Strategies
Strategy Description
N > 95th percentile, by Number of visits is too high, separate values for each
season season
M > 95th percentile, by M statistic is too high, separate values for each season
season
MN > 95th percentile Calculate M x N, value is too high
N is too high (top 0.5% distribution)
N and MN rules OR M x N is too high (top 0.5% distribution)
OR both N is high (>80%) and M x N is high (>80%)
These detection strategies were chosen as possible cutoffs because they provide an
observed significance level, or p-value, of 0.05. The first three tests, N > 9 5th
M > 9 5th percentile, and the product test, MN > 95th percentile, all have p-values of 0.05.
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These percentile cutoff values are determined by the specific statistical sampling that is
done as the m-statistic baseline values are computed. [13] The composite test, which
uses three possible rules, also represents a p-value of 0.05. Instead of simply being the
tail-end of a normal distribution, these rule sets represent three separate piece-wise
segments of the n, m domain that all sum to the a p-value of 0.05. These detection
strategies are described here because they each represent the same observed significance
level, however one detection strategy, the product MN > 9 5th percentile strategy, has a
higher observed detection rate, so it will likely be used to a greater extent in practice.
Here, we will only use the m-statistic detection rates of semi-synthetic datasets to validate
the m-statistic's detection of those datasets, rather than to rigorously validate the m-
statistic. A validation of the m-statistic itself should include a complete ROC curve,
which describes the tradeoff between sensitivity and specificity of a specific test. If this
is not included in a validation of a test, it would allow for a test that always detects a
cluster in a semi-synthetic dataset, but also often detects a cluster in a dataset without
one. However, this validation and ROC curve is out of the scope of this work, so we use
the simpler detection rate analysis as an illustration of effective semi-synthetic dataset
detection.
Test Clusters Used for M-Statistic Validation
A set of 252 synthetic test clusters were created to determine the detection rate for
the M-Statistic test. Those synthetic clusters were combined with authentic emergency
department data from Children's Hospital Boston (CHB). Each of the cluster datasets
was combined with each of 204 weeks of CHB ED patient data to create a total of 51,408
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semi-synthetic datasets for M-Statistic validation. The test sets contained a range of each
of the possible cluster generator parameters, enumerated in Table 3, below.
Table 4: Test Cluster Parameter Values
Cluster Parameter Values
Distance from Reference Point 5, 15, 50 miles
Radius of cluster 250, 500, 1000, 3000 meters
Cluster Magnitude 10, 25, 40 patients
Cluster Duration 1 day
Angle from Reference Point 36, 72, 108, 144, 180, 216, 252, 288, 324, 360 deg.
M-Statistic Detection Rates by Strategy
Seasonally, using 12,852 (one fourth of the 51,408 total) test clusters, each detection
strategy was used and overall detection rates were observed as listed in Table 5, below.
These results represent the percentage of test clusters that were detected using each of the
strategies for each season of data. Some of these detection rates seem quite low, but that
is because one third of the test clusters only added ten patients to the entire week of test
data. This small of a perturbation to the overall weekly datasets did not appear to be
uncovered well by the N detection strategy (which depends entirely on the number of
visits over the week. There is a significant increase in the detection rates of spring and
summer clusters using the N-based detection strategy. This is likely due to the strong
seasonal decrease in hospital emergency room admissions during the spring and summer.
The increase in seasonal admissions during the winter and fall decrease the ability to
detect clusters purely on the number of emergency department admissions alone. This is
due to the overall number of patients and the variability (and standard deviation) of those
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admission rates during the winter and fall being significantly higher than those in the
spring and summer.
Table 5: M-Statistic Detection Rates for Various Strategies, by season
Cluster Detection Strategy Percentage of test clusters that triggered alarms
All Seasons Winter Spring Summer Fall
N > 95th percentile 16.24 11.40 21.67 19.66 11.97
M > 95th percentile 49.13 43.61 49.42 55.35 48.01
M*N > 95th percentile 62.32 55.43 63.49 70.90 59.27
N and M*N Composite 55.83 66.60 49.61 55.01 52.52
The purely spatial clustering detection strategy (M-based detection) also varies
seasonally. This is likely due to the nature of the type of detection strategy involved -
while spatial clustering should be no more prevalent in the absence of actual outbreaks
during any one season than another, it is likely that any cluster at all will stand out more
when there are fewer patients. This is the case during the summer, when there are
sometimes fewer than half the number of patients (on average by week number) than
there are during some winter weeks. There is, however, a statistically significant
decrease in the purely spatial detection strategy during the winter season. One hypothesis
as to why this might be true is that seasonally, during winter, there were significant
influenza outbreaks in the test locations in each winter dataset that was used. This type
of outbreak would make the overall baseline clustering closeness threshold higher for the
winter than in other seasons, because a contagious (and likely closely-clustered) outbreak
adds many more small inter-point distances to the baseline M-statistic inter-point distance
distribution.
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Another potentially interesting finding is that the N and M*N composite-based
test serves as the best detection strategy during the winter season, and also, as a strategy,
has its highest detection rates during the winter. One potential reason for this is that the
N and M*N composite detection strategy has as one option the rule 'both N is high (>80
percentile)' and 'M x N is high (>80 percentile)', which appears to be a useful indicator
in cases where there is neither a significantly high N nor a significantly high M*N value.
With an N-based or M*N-based strategy percentile value of higher lower than 95, neither
of those detection strategies will pick up potential clusters that have questionable
numbers of patients and questionable spatial clustering. Both of these together provide
some motive for believing that there is a cluster present in a given dataset, and this is
likely the case during the winter, when both N and M*N values are high, but not high
enough to be detected using the other three alarm strategies.
Another controlled feature set component that can be used for separate analysis of
the test cluster datasets is the size of the cluster in number of patients. The artificial test
datasets add either 10, 25, or 40 patients to each of the weeks of patient data. Table 6
contains the detection rates for each of the three cluster sizes, for each detection strategy.
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Table 6: Sensitivity to detect simulated clusters of three sizes
Percentage of test clusters that triggered alarms
#t extraCluster detection strategy visi ts All seasons Winter Spring Summer Fall
M > 95 %ile, by season 10 8.30 6.30 7.81 11.73 7.32
25 57.41 47.09 60.34 65.52 56.36
40 81.69 77.44 80.10 88.81 80.34
MN > 95 %ile 10 20.93 13.87 21.43 32.69 15.52
25 74.69 65.35 76.61 84.70 71.82
40 91.35 87.06 92.42 95.33 90.46
N and MN rules 10 14.86 35.22 6.43 9.56 8.97
25 65.12 74.67 57.68 67.17 61.38
40 87.50 89.91 84.71 88.30 87.21
In all cluster detection strategies, larger clusters are more easily detected, which
should be expected, because larger clusters provide larger changes from the expected
distributions of patients. The ability of M-Statistic detection using small sized clusters
and only spatial data was very low during the winter, but detection was quite successful
during the summer using only spatial data. This is likely due to the fact that there are a
greater number of patients in the winter, so additional patients with no aberrant spatial
properties will be less easy to locate. Another noticeable difference is that the spatial
only (M-based detection) detection strategy has significantly lower detection rates than
the other two detection strategies. This is likely due to the fact that the other two
detection strategies incorporate temporal data much more significantly, so an increase in
the number of patients added should increase the chance that temporal detection values
would be higher than normal. This is confirmed by the increase of ten percent or more,
seasonally. Also worth noting is that in all strategies and in all seasons, the M-Statistic
algorithm detected artificially added clusters of size 25 in over 75% of cases.
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Artificial clusters were added to authentic patient data at three different distances
to the Children's Hospital Boston centerpoint: 5, 15 and 50 km. The detection rates for
each of the M-Statistic strategies in each season are listed below in Table 7. Increases in
detection rates were observed as the clusters were added farther away from the hospital.
This is likely due to the fact that the areas farther away from the hospital are less densely-
populated, so an increase in the number of patients there is more significant and visible to
the system than is an increase in the number of patients in a more densely-populated
neighborhood.
Table 7: Sensitivity to detect simulated clusters at three distances from the hospital
Percentage of test clusters that triggered alarms
Cluster detection strategy Km from All seasons Winter Spring Summer Fall
_____________________ hospital_______________
M > 95 %ile, by season 5 33.20 27.68 30.19 43.76 31.11
15 57.65 55.64 56.76 65.35 52.84
50 63.38 54.35 69.55 61.90 67.31
IN > 95 %ile 5 49.33 41.82 50.58 60.26 44.42
15 69.81 62.78 71.01 76.89 68.35
50 73.41 67.51 74.40 80.13 71.40
N and MN rules 5 42.44 56.21 34.10 40.92 39.08
15 62.87 72.02 57.47 62.91 59.43
_ _7_ _ 50 67.92 76.03 63.90 67.25 64.80
One final controlled feature set component was the radius of the cluster; the
radius defines the size of the space into which the same number of points are placed.
This is then indirectly a measure of cluster density, which should have an appreciable
effect on detection using the M-Statistic's spatial strategies, because the spatial strategies
measure the distribution of inter-patient distances. Decreasing the radius should increase
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the number of patients that are close together in this distribution, so it should be expected
that smaller radius clusters should likely have higher detection rates. An increasing trend
as the radius of the cluster is decreased (with a single detection strategy and season,) but
the detection rate appears to plateau below a radius of size 500 m. This is somewhat
unexpected, because the patients in a cluster with a 250 m radius are four times as
densely packed as the patients in a cluster with a radius of 500 m. One possible
explanation for this observation is that the M-Statistic uses only ten bins to discretize the
overall inter-point distance distribution in a given set of patients, with distances ranging
from two patients in the same place (zero miles apart) to patients up to 100 miles apart.
Because there are only ten bins into which to store the overall distribution, there may be a
significant loss of small-scale patient visit information using this technique. Even though
the patients in the smaller clusters are four times as densely packed, they appear almost as
densely packed to the M-Statistic algorithm, because most of those patients probably
appear in the smallest size inter-point distance bin already. One example of bin cutoffs,
for Children's Hospital Boston, GI, fall m-statistic:
0 2.45 4.23 6.08 8.09 10.64 13.92 18.11 23.59 30.85 100 miles
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Table 8: Sensitivity to detect simulated clusters with four radius sizes
Percent time alarm was triggered
RadiusCluster detection strategy in km All seasons Winter Spring Summer Fall
M > 95 %ile, by season 250 m 54.75 48.10 55.56 61.47 53.67
500 m 53.82 47.48 54.24 60.58 52.81
1 km 51.73 45.72 51.81 59.05 50.18
3 km 36.24 33.15 36.08 40.31 35.36
MN > 95 %ile 250 m 66.97 59.54 68.82 75.04 64.25
500 m 66.41 59.10 67.67 74.96 63.68
1 km 64.71 57.75 65.94 73.11 61.82
3 km 51.21 45.32 51.53 60.51 47.33
N and MN rules 250 m 60.67 69.52 55.00 61.18 57.34
500 m 59.93 69.12 54.10 60.33 56.55
1 km 58.28 67.91 52.47 58.33 54.81
3 km 44.44 59.87 36.88 40.21 41.38
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Chapter 5: Discussion: Present Results and
Future Development
Use of the Cluster Creation Tool
The current goal for use of the cluster creation tool is to evaluate multiple spatial
detection algorithms using semi-synthetic datasets containing clusters that vary over all
reasonable parameters and values. In order to make the testing of this algorithm realistic,
the clusters that are created by the tool must include the most realistic possible situations
for actual patient cluster creation.
Pertinent Syndromic Surveillance Future Objectives
A good deal of work has been done in the field of epidemiology to determine what the
most pertinent and realistic patient models of syndromic spread are. Once the most
realistic scenarios are assessed and mathematically described, they can be
programmatically implemented and incorporated into the cluster creation tool. Several of
the most promising scenarios are described below and will be likely implemented as
improvements to the current tool.
Modeling the Super-Spreader Phenomenon
Another valuable model to create in the cluster tool would be to create distributions of
multiple sub groups within a cluster group that each grow in time, following the so-called
"super-spreader" phenomenon. In this example, one patient begins to spread (in time and
space) a disease, which is then spread farther by super-spreaders who each create their
own geospatial and temporal patient cluster distributions. Those resulting distributions
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likely follow similar time courses and spatial growth patterns. This super-spreader
phenomenon has been observed with several diseases and would be expected in the case
of a syndrome with an incubation time or another set of realistic conditions that lead to
this type of spread.
Nearest Neighbor Mapping
At present, the cluster generator produces patient addresses in unrealistic locations such
as rivers and oceans. To address this problem, it is possible to map each point to its
nearest neighbor in a database of patient addresses or in a database containing all physical
addresses. One issue with nearest neighbor mapping is that some locations will end up
heavily populated with inappropriate cluster points. For example, if a cluster is created in
the ocean, all the cluster points will map to addresses along the coast line. This is an
unrealistic model set of points because the user was attempting to create a single, circular
cluster, and may receive a bimodal or oddly-shaped cluster as output. This problem may
be alleviated by allowing no two points to map to the same point, or by deleting points
which do not map closely to a physical address. More work needs to be done to
determine if either of these are accurate descriptions of how a disease might spread.
Relating cluster density proportionally with population density
Another pertinent question for future development is whether artificial cluster density
should match location population density proportionally. The benefits of this would be
added realism in the test sets of clusters, because the number of patients that appears in
an outbreak is very likely related to the number of people per unit of area in a certain
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location. Census data is publicly available at the census block group level that describes
the population density for relatively small areas. This data could be harnessed to allow a
user to specify a number of patients to add to a cluster per unit of population density.
Using a metric such as number of patients to add to the cluster per population per square
mile would allow clusters to be created with a dynamic number of patients that would
probably be more appropriate and interpretable than just a user-specified number of
people.
Cluster Location Distributions
For specific types of outbreaks, different geographic patient distributions have been
observed. Similar to the addressed issues of time-evolution modeling of artificial patients
in the cluster, the physical distribution of the patients in a cluster may be very valuable
during analysis, because of the additional information that it may provide algorithms.
This additional analysis information could be harnessed by a tool that might
interpret geographic cluster distributions and give some sort of parameter-set or value
back to describe the orientation and/or distribution of the points. With this basic analysis
of the distribution, specific algorithms could be chosen for analysis and there would also
be an additional set of clues as to the possible sorts of illnesses that might be involved.
There are also considerations related to the types of geospatial distributions. It
will be valuable to research how those clusters could be situated in real-life examples.
Geographic possibilities are Gaussian, Linear, Exponential, teardrop, among others.
Limitations of Cluster Generator
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An advantage of controlled feature set simulations is that any set of parameters
can be chosen to mimic a known or theoretical outbreak. However, the use of any
simulated data for benchmarking syndromic surveillance systems carries the risk of
evaluating performance under unrealistic conditions. The controlled feature set
simulation approach entails the explicit assumption that the historical data are pure noise
and contain no signal. For bioterrorism-related events, this assumption is almost
certainly true. However, it is quite possible, and even likely, that detectable outbreaks of
naturally occurring infection are contained within the historical data.
Another limitation is that this approach does not account for processes occurring
at the syndromic grouping stage, because artificial cases are injected directly into the data
stream. When a case of true upper respiratory infection presents to the ED, it may or may
not be correctly assigned to the proper syndromic group based on a chief complaint or
ICD code. The approach could be modified, however, to introduce simulated cases
earlier in the process, hypothetically presenting them to the syndromic classifier, enabling
modeling of the accuracy of the syndromic grouping process. Also, in live syndromic
surveillance systems, records representing specific events for a given day may be
transmitted from the data sources at different points in time. Such time delays could be
incorporated into the controlled feature set simulations. In the experiments described,
several discrete parameter values are assigned. Another approach would be to use a
method such as Monte Carlo simulation to redefine the model parameters over a
smoother distribution of values. Importantly, the application of controlled feature set
simulation to surveillance using multivariate data streams requires explicit assumptions
about the relationships among the signal features across data sets.
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Conclusion
The use of semi-synthetic datasets containing authentic background noise and
outbreaks defined by a controlled feature set provides a valuable means for benchmarking
the detection performance of syndromic surveillance systems. A cluster generator was
implemented with the ability to quickly create semi-synthetic test clusters for use in
evaluating detection rates of spatial detection algorithms under a variety of controlled
feature set conditions.
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Appendix A: Real-time M-Statistic
Documentation
Real-Time M-Statistic Patient Spatial-Clustering Detection System
Calculates the real-time M-Statistic values for a specific hospital, syndrome,
and date span against a baseline computed separately. An implimentation of the M-
Statistic spatial cluster detection approach.
Libraries Imported
java.sql.*;
java.lang.Math.*;
java.lang.Object.*;
java.util.*;
java.io.*;
Jama.*;
The first five imported libraries are Sun Java (TM) 1.4.2 libraries. Jama.* is the
numerics and matrices Java Class Library that helps store and manipulate M-Stat
matrices, and is publicly available from http://math.nist.gov/javanumerics/jama/, created
by The Math Works and the NIST
M-Stat API-Level Methods
public static void executeCompositeMstatForRegion ( int region-id, int
int_numprev-days )
This method computes the composite m-statistic for a region (which is comprised of a
group of hospitals with the same region-id field value. ) This uses all patients from all of
those hospitals that meet the basic inclusion requirements for the computation (same
syndrome, same date span.)
This method does not allow for customization of the m-stat query and only takes the
region-id and the number of days to compute each syndrome's mstat.
Outbreaks are entered into the outbreaks table of the database as appropriate.
public static void executeAllMstatsForRegion( int region-id, int num-prev-days)
This method independently executes all of the relevant mstat calculations for a region,
but does not combine the patients from different hospitals into one single mstat
calculation for each syndrome. Instead, patients with each syndrome, from each hospital
are run independently of one another.
Outbreaks are entered into the outbreaks table of the database as appropriate.
public static void executeAllMstatsForSpecHosp ( int num-prev-days ,int hosp-id )
This method calculates the mstat values for each syndrome from a single hospital for the
past n days.
Outbreaks are entered into the outbreaks table of the database as appropriate.
public static void executeAllMstatsGeneralNDays ( int num-prev-days )
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This method independently executes all of the relevant mstat calculations for a region,
but does not combine the patients in the calculation. Patients with each syndrome from
each hospital are run independently of one another.
Outbreaks are entered into the outbreaks table of the database as appropriate.
public static Vector getSyndromeldVector() throws ClassNotFoundException,
SQLException
This method returns a vector of Integer objects that contains the active syndromes in the
database relation syndrome info. Active syndromes are determined by inspection of the
active field, which has a value of' 'for active syndromes.
public static Vector getHospitalldVectoro throws ClassNotFoundException,
SQLException
This method returns a hospital id vector which is a vector of Integer objects that contains
only hospitals with an active field = 1 in the hospitals table.
public static Vector getHospitalldVectorInRegion(int region-id) throws
ClassNotFoundException, SQLException
This method returns a hospital id vector which is a vector of Integer objects; this only
returns the active hospitals in a specific region. Active is described in the hospitals
relation of the database with active = 1.
public static void executeMstatLastNDaysSingle ( int num-prev-days, String
season, int syndrome id , int hospital-id )
This is a helper method that simply handles getting the Timestamps that are relevant for
the date span that will be part of the actual Mstat calculation.
public static void executeMstatSpecific (String season, int syndromelid, int
hospital-id, Timestamp startdate, Timestamp end date )
This method is the most specific execution method for the mstatistic. It allows for a
specific start and end date, specific hospital id, syndromeid, and season, and
automatically retrieves the appropriate values, calculates the specific m-statistic value,
compares that calculated value against the baseline value in the database, and then
writes an outbreak into the outbreaks table of the database as appropriate.
public static void writeOutbreaksToDatabase(Vector outbreakVector) throws
ClassNotFoundException, SQLException
This method takes a Vector of Outbreak objects and writes it to the outbreaks table.
Outbreak objects follow the descriptions in the Outbreak class section of the
documentation, and specify whether the calculated mstat value was over the expected
threshold by some specified amount.
public static Timestamp getCurrentTimestampo
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This method returns the current time as ajava.sql. Timestamp. It is a helper used to
calculate specific date spans for methods that require timestamps.
public static Timestamp getTimestampNDaysBefore( Timestamp
currentTimestamp, int daysBefore )
This method takes ajava.sql. Timestamp and returns ajava.sql. Timestamp that
corresponds to the date/time of the current time less n days before. This is a helper
method used to calculate specific date spans for methods that require them, as well.
public static String findCurrentSeasono
This helper method returns a String that is either "winter", "spring", "summer", or
'fall", depending on the appropriate season. This is a potential change in v.2.0 to ints
with findCurrentSeasonlnto.
public static Vector requestLongLatsFromDatabaseSpecific( Timestamp start-date,
Timestamp end-date, int syndrome id, int hospital-id ) throws
ClassNotFoundException, SQLException
Helper method to retrieve a Vector ofLongLat Objects for a specific date span,
syndrome-id, and hospital-id. This method must be called from a try/catch loop.
public static Vector requestVisitsFromDatabaseForHosp( Timestamp start date,
Timestamp end-date, int hospital-id ) throws ClassNotFoundException,
SQLException
This method returns the Visit objects that meet the criteria from a specific hospital and
date span. There is a Visit class described separately. This method retrieves Visit objects
corresponding to patients with all active syndromes.
public static Vector requestVisitsFromDatabaseForRegion( Timestamp start-date,
Timestamp end-date, int region-id ) throws ClassNotFoundException,
SQLException
This method returns the Visit objects that meet the criteria from all hospitals in a specific
region and date span. There is a Visit class described separately. This method retrieves
Visit objects corresponding to patients with all active syndromes.
public static Matrix calcObsMinusExpMatrix( Matrix binCountsMatrix, int
vectorSize )
This method is used by the calculate Mstatistic methods to actually calculate the
observed minus expected value vector described in the m-statistic literature.
public static Matrix sortDistanceslntoBins( Matrix binMatrix, Vector
distanceColumnVectors )
This helper method sorts the interpoint distances into the ten value-based bins, as
described in the m-statistic literature.
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Appendix B: Availability and Program
Requirements
* Project name: AEGIS Cluster Creation Tool
* Project home page: http://sourceforge.net/chipcluster/
* Operating system(s): Platform independent
* Programming language: Java
* Other requirements: Java 1.3.1 or higher
* License: e.g. GNU LGPL
* Any restrictions to use by non-academics: none
List of abbreviations
" ED - Emergency Department
" GIS - Geographical Information Systems
" ICD-9 - International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision
* GUI - Graphical User Interface
* CSV - Comma-Separated Values
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